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Introduction
Years of consistently severe underfunding, increased caseloads
and inadequate resources have created a serious crisis in this nation's
public defender system. These factors have gravely eroded the crimi-
nal defendant's right to adequate representation which is guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment and was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainwright.1 Moreover, criminal defendants' right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is also being denied be-
cause the ineffective assistance of counsel provided by public defend-
ers has a disproportionate impact upon racial minorities.
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. Stanford University, 1992. The author would like
to thank Professor David Faigman, David Avila and Kate Dyer. Special thanks to my
family for their support throughout all my endeavors. This note is dedicated to the many
committed public defenders working under difficult conditions to ensure legal representa-
tion for all criminal defendants and to all those working to end racism in the criminal
justice system and throughout the country.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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In the United States, racial minorities are disproportionately
poor2 and, as a result, disproportionately require public defenders
when charged with crimes. Therefore, the ineffective assistance that
public defenders often provide due to inadequate resources particu-
larly disadvantages people of color. This is a clear denial of Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection to racial minorities. As a suspect
class, any breach of their fundamental right to counsel must be ex-
amined under a strict scrutiny analysis.
This Note will demonstrate that the underfunding of public de-
fender offices results in representation which violates indigent racial
minorities' Sixth Amendment right to counsel and their Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Section I explores
the establishment of the fundamental right to counsel under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments and its expansion in Gideon v. Wain-
wright.4 Section II describes the chronic underfunding in public de-
fenders' offices and explores how this lack of resources often results in
ineffective assistance of counsel to indigent clients. Section III statisti-
cally establishes that people of color are disproportionately poor in
the United States, and, consequently, are disproportionately repre-
sented by public defenders. Section IV addresses the historic discrimi-
nation racial minorities have faced under the American criminal
justice system. Section V explores the equal protection ramifications
of underfunded public defender offices, including discussions of the
intentional discrimination and disparate impact doctrines. Section VI
suggests that this equal protection violation should be considered
under a strict scrutiny standard because racial minorities are being dis-
criminated against in their fundamental right to counsel. Section VII
considers the possible legislative responses to this discrimination. Sec-
tion VIII offers several proposals to end the discrimination against
racial minorities with regard to their constitutional right to adequate
representation.
I. Gideon v. Wainwright and the Right to Counsel
Thirty years. ago, prisoner Clarence Earl Gideon submitted a
handwritten habeas corpus petition to the United States Supreme
Court claiming that the State of Florida had violated his constitutional
2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF
UNrrED STATES, 473 (1993) (Table No. 744).
3. For a discussion of "suspect class" under equal protection analysis, see Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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rights to counsel and due process. Gideon had been convicted in a
Florida court without any assistance of counsel for the felony offense
of breaking and entering a poolroom. At trial, Gideon informed the
court that he could not afford counsel and was unable to conduct his
own defense. The trial court denied Gideon's request for counsel be-
cause Florida law only provided lawyers to indigent persons charged
with capital offenses.
The Supreme Court, in a majority decision written by Justice
Hugo Black, held that those charged with a felony in a state court who
could not afford a lawyer must have one appointed for them at no
charge. 5 The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of
Counsel [sic] for his defence."6 The Court in Gideon extended this
federal right to counsel to state courts as well.7 The Court found that
"those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safe-
guards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally pro-
tected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 8
The Court specifically overruled Betts v. Brady,9 a case with facts
similar to Gideon, which had held that the right to counsel was not a
fundamental right. The Court stated:
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption... that a provision of the
Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial'
is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in con-
cluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not
one of these fundamental rights.'"
In Strickland v. Washington," the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
right to counsel as a fundamental right and gave meaning to the prom-
ise of Gideon. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment not only
required counsel for indigent criminal defendants, but also that the
appointed counsel must provide effective assistance to their clients.' 2
5. Id. at 344.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
7. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341.
8. Id.
9. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
10. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
11. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. Id. at 686. The Strickland court established the test for determining when counsel
has rendered ineffective assistance. This test requires a convicted defendant to show: (1)
that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that "counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment" and (2) that the deficient performance by his counsel prejudiced the defense,
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The Gideon decision ended 172 years of the denial of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to indigent criminal defendants in state
proceedings.' 3 After Gideon, poor people could not be tried for felo-
nies in any court-federal or state-without representation by
counsel.1
4
Implementation of Gideon, however, presented some serious lo-
gistical problems. A great number of felony cases would now require
appointed counsel. As a result, organized systems to provide lawyers
for indigent criminal defendants developed around the country. Prior
to 1963, few cities had public defender offices or any means by which
to provide counsel to indigents in felony cases.' Today, public funds
pay for the cost of lawyers in eighty percent of this nation's felony
cases.' 6 Most U.S. counties have adopted an organized indigent de-
fense system, and all counties provide lawyers to represent defendants
accused of felonies in state courts who cannot afford representation.' 7
H. The Underfunding of Public Defender's Offices
Yet, only thirty years after Gideon established the right to coun-
sel in state courts, that right is in jeopardy due to dire underfunding of
the indigent defense systems throughout this nation. 8 The American
Bar Association's Special Committee on Funding the Justice System
recently reported that nearly eighty percent of the legal needs of poor
people are not met each year. 9 As a result, the "justice system and
the concept of justice itself in the United States is sorely threatened by
a lack of resources."2 One lawyer at the Cook County Public De-
fender's Office in Chicago stated what many public defenders feel
throughout the country: "There are simply too many cases for the
number of public defenders we have. ' 21
i.e., "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable." Id. at 687.
13. Nancy A. Goldberg & Marshall J. Hartman, After 3 Decades, Gideon's Plea for
Fairness Still Echoes in State Courts, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., May 3, 1993, at 6.
14. Later cases such as Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), extended this right
to counsel to misdemeanors when a defendant faces a potential sentence of up to six
months in prison.
15. See Goldberg & Hartman, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Although the underfunding problem affects court-appointed attorneys and appel-
late-level public defenders offices as well, this Note will focus primarily on the underfund-
ing of trial-level public defender offices in state and federal court.
19. Goldberg & Hartman, supra note 13, at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10 (quoting Rita Frye, Public Defender of Cook County).
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This combination of increasingly meager resources and soaring
caseloads has prompted persistent questioning as to whether the
promise of effective representation for indigent criminal defendants is
being fulfilled. Many court observers have begun to sound the alarm
bell.22 As one observer has noted, "America has never fully lived up
to the Supreme Court's promise. Indigent-defense systems nationally
... either are experiencing a crisis or are on the verge of one. The
promise of effective representation is in jeopardy."'  Others have
stated that "the spirit of Gideon v. Wainwright is undermined... as
legislators scour the state budget for ways to make cuts. Public de-
fenders carry twice the caseload they should under national stan-
dards."2z4 Defense lawyers simply cannot adequately represent all of
their clients due to the severe burdens of inadequate funding.' There
seems to be a general feeling that public defenders are underpaid and
overwhelmed.26 As is typically the case, the reality is even worse than
the perception.
Today, one chief reason for the crisis in indigent defense systems
is the "War on Drugs." During the 1980s more resources were pro-
vided to police and prosecutors which led to increased arrests, prose-
cutions and trials. This created more work for public defenders, but
without a proportional increase in financial support. A director of the
Defender Division of the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion observed,
The war on drugs is funneling tens of millions of federal dollars
into state and local police and prosecution budgets, resulting in
a massive increase in the number of arrests and prosecutions.
But defense programs are not getting anywhere near compara-
ble funding to help them deal with the flood of new cases.27
According to a draft report of the ABA Criminal Justice Section's Ad
Hoc Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis, "one result of the
22. See, e.g., Jill Smolowe, The Trials of the Public Defender: Overworked and Un-
derpaid Lawyers Serve Up a Brand of Justice That is Not Always in Their Clients' Best
Interests, TiME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 48; Christopher Johns, 'Slaughterhouse Justice'. Crushing
Workloads, Underfunded Public Defenders Shortchange Indigent Clients, AMz. REPUBLIC,
May 23, 1993; Steve Berry, 30 Years Ago, Gideon Won Freedom, Justice for the Poor, OR-
LANDo SnrmNEL, July 18, 1993.
23. Johns, supra note 22, at Cl.
24. Berry, supra note 22, at Al.
25. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment" Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to
Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IrD.. L. 363, 363 (1993).
26. Smolowe, supra note 22, at 49.
27. Johns, supra note 22, at Cl (quoting Mary Broderick of the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association).
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War on Drugs is that attorneys for indigent defendants are over-
worked and underpaid."'
Providing money to defend indigent suspects was apparently a
low priority during the War on Drugs.2 9 During the Bush administra-
tion, various agencies at all levels of the government spent about $100
billion to fight drugs.30 In 1990, according to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, almost one-third of court commitments were drug related,
an increase of 11.5% since 1977.31 A "blue ribbon" panel appointed
by Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the federal court's most
serious problem is the unprecedented number of federal narcotics
prosecutions.32 This War on Drugs also adversely affects state courts.
By 1990, seventy-five percent of all criminal prosecutions in Los An-
geles were drug-related.33 Yet nationally, only a little more than one
billion dollars-just one-hundredth of the amount spent on the War
on Drugs-is spent on all indigent criminal legal services.' It is clear
that providing support for indigent defense programs is not a high pri-
ority in American spending. In fact, while there were explosive in-
creases in the spending to fight drugs and crime, the budgets of some
indigent defense programs were actually cut.35
The new "War on Crime" in the 1990's reflects increased public
demands for tougher sentencing, increased prosecutions, more jails
and a general "get tough on crime" attitude.36 An example of this
attitude is the federal and state "Three Strikes You're Out" laws. Vot-
ers in the state of Washington passed a Three Strikes initiative by a
seventy-five percent margin during the 1993 election which guarantees
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for any person con-
28. A.B.A. Annual Meeting, Indigent Defendants' Counsel Overworked, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 9, 1993, at 9.
29. Smolowe, supra note 22, at 48.
30. Johns, supra note 22, at C1.
31. Id.
32. Richard Klein & Robert Spangenberg, The Indigent Defense Crisis, 1983 A.B.A.,
SEc. CRIM. JUST. 4 (Ad Hoc Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis).
33. Id.
34. Johns, supra note 22.
35. See Klein, supra note 25.
36. During the November, 1993 election, the people of Washington state, by referen-
dum, passed a "Three Strikes You're Out" law. The same day, California voted to make
permanent an existing tax to provide $1.5 billion for public safety which ensures more
police and firemen, and Texas endorsed a one billion dollar bond to build more prisons and
mental health facilities. The day after the elections, the House of Representatives passed
another crime bill which will subsidize the hiring of 50,000 more police officers. See George
F. Will, Are We a Nation of Cowards?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 94.
victed of a violent felony for the third time.37 California's "Three
Strikes" measure38 was signed into law on March 7, 1994 and is being
hailed as the nation's toughest anti-crime law.39 It has been predicted
that the California measure will incarcerate 275,621 more inmates
over the next three decades, and require that twenty more prisons be
built over the next six years. This is in addition to the twenty-eight
currently in operation and the twelve others now on the drawing
board.4
Some California judges refuse to apply the "Three Strikes" law.41
Sonoma County Superior Court Judge Lawrence Antolini declared
the three-strikes law unconstitutional because it handed down "cruel
and unusual" jail terms for nonviolent criminals.42 The California
measure does not distinguish between "violent" and "serious" felo-
nies.43 For a person who has one felony conviction, even a very minor
felony may count as the third strike.44 Already, crimes such as mug-
ging a homeless person for fifty cents and shoplifting a bottle of beer
have counted as third strikes which may send people to prison for
life.45 Just in Los Angeles County, prosecutors filed more than 750
third-strike cases in the first six months after the law was enacted.46
With a felony conviction potentially having such severe consequences
under the California "Three Strikes" law, criminal defendants are opt-
ing for trial rather than plea-bargaining to felonies.47 This increase in
trials creates even more work for already overworked public defend-
37. Grover G. Norquist, GOP Hat Trick; AM. SPEcrATOR, Jan. 1994 at 53.
38. Assembly Bill 971, Chapter 12, 1994 Ca. Sess. Law. California's "Three Strikes
You're Out" measure sets a minimum of 25 years in prison for third-time felony offenders
already convicted of two violent felonies, doubles sentences for second felonies and limits
time off for good behavior on second and third convictions. According to an estimate by
the state legislature, the measure could cost the state several billion dollars a year. Previ-
ous harsh sentencing measures in California have quadrupled the state's prison population
in the last 10 years without any decrease in the crime rate. Elizabeth Gleick, Slamming the
Prison Door: A Daughter's Murder Triggers an Angry Father's Crusade Against Repeat
Offenders, PnoPL, Feb. 7, 1994, at 52.
39. Vlae Kershner & Greg Lucas, 'Three Strikes' Signed into California Law, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 8, 1994, at Al.
40. Vlae Kershner, '3 Strikes' Initiative-A Vast, Expansive Plan, S.F. CHRON., Mar., 1,
1994, at Al.
41. Marc Peyser & Donna Foote, Strike Three, You're Not Out, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29,
1994, at 53.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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ers. Judges and prosecutors are trying to short-circuit the law by
charging crimes as misdemeanors instead of felonies or dismissing
prior felonies to avoid a third strike, but this policy has been criticized
as "thwarting the will of the people."4 The "Three Strikes" idea is so
popular in California that a "Three Strikes" ballot initiative was over-
whelmingly passed by the voters in the past election.4 9 The "Three
Strikes" initiative, basically identical to the current statute, requires a
vote by a two-third majority of the legislature in order to ever repeal
or amend the law.5 0
California is clearly not the only state clamoring for a renewed
"toughness" on crime. Sixteen states currently have a "Three Strikes"
measure and others appear likely to follow.5 The federal government
has also included its own "Three Strikes" bill as part of the 1994 Om-
nibus Crime Bill.5 2 Under the federal law, a violent felon could be
sent to prison without the possibility of parole after being convicted of
a third federal crime following two previous convictions.5 3 The fed-
eral crime bill also appropriated approximately thirteen billion dollars
for police grants and approximately ten billion for prisons.5 4
The "get tough on crime" attitude crosses party lines and is seem-
ingly a political necessity in this day and age when crime is one of the
biggest concerns of the American public. Delaware Senator Joe
Biden noted, while he was the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair,
"Three strikes is the wacko product of other Senators eager to outdo
their colleagues on the toughness scale."15 5 Senator Bob Dole has said
simply, "[t]he American people want decisive action on crime in
America."56 Yet, there has been great criticism levied at various
"Three Strikes" proposals. At a National Press Club luncheon, Jesse
Jackson stated:
Fear about crime is on the rise. People want to feel safe when
they walk down their streets. We need a serious program on
crime .... Three strikes and you're out, or in prison for the rest
of your life, is the current rage. It sounds American[.] It fits on
the bumper. The posture is tough. Support in the polls is off the
48. Id.
49. California Election Returns, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1994, at A20.
50. Peyser & Foote, supra note 41.
51. Id.
52. The Congressional Crime Bill, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
53. Peyser & Foote, supra note 41.
54. The Congressional Crime Bill, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
55. Michael Kramer, Tough. But Smart?, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 29.
56. Catherine Crier & Bernard Shaw, Clinton Preparing for State of Union Address, on
INsmE PoLrrics, (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 25, 1994).
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chart. Every anxious knee-jerk politician has rushed to support
it... Yet,... the proposal makes no sense. It will waste scarce
resources, imprisoning geriatrics barely able to remember the
crimes of their youth, at $20,000 a head for a year minimum....
And, as we know, these laws will discriminate against African-
Americans and Latinos.57
The problem with this "get tough on crime" attitude in America
is that, "indigent defense just doesn't have a high priority.... The fact
is, everything is 'law and order, let's lock everybody up,' and it's law
enforcement that's getting the money. "58 Therefore, more money
spent arresting, jailing and prosecuting these three time felons does
not necessarily translate into equal resources for defense services.
With the threat of increasing punishments for criminal defendants,
there also must be an increase in the constitutional protections pro-
vided. Yet, in a 1989 Gallup poll, seventy-nine percent of those sur-
veyed said that they were "more worried about criminals being let off
too easily than they were about infringing the constitutional rights of
defendants."5 9 Underfunded public defenders face a hard struggle to
guarantee that indigent criminal defendants receive the same constitu-
tional protections afforded wealthy criminal defendants.6"
It is the most disenfranchised people who do not have the re-
sources to protect themselves, whose constitutional rights must be
protected most
The battle for equal justice is being lost in the trenches of the
criminal courts where the promise of Gideon and Argersinger
goes unfulfilled.... Casualties are defendants accused of street
crimes, virtually all of whom are poor, uneducated, and unem-
ployed. They are the persons being represented all too often by
'walking violations of the [S]ixth [A]mendment.' 61
Clarence Darrow, in a speech given eighty-five years ago to inmates in
the Cook County Jail, wondered, "If the courts were organized to pro-
mote justice, the people would elect somebody to defend all criminals,
somebody as smart as the prosecutor-and give him as many detec-
57. Jesse Jackson, National Press Club Luncheon Address by Jesse Jackson, FEDERAL
NEWS SERvICE, Feb. 17, 1994.
58. Peter Applebome, Study Faults Atlanta's System of Defending Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1990, at B5 (quoting Vernon S. Pitts, director of the Fulton County Public De-
fender's Office).
59. Andy Court, Is There A Crisis?, AM. LAWYER, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 47.
60. Thomas E. Daniels, Gideon's Hollow Promise-How Appointed Counsel Are Pre-
vented from Fulfilling Their Role in the Criminal Justice System, 71 MICH. B. J. 136, 138
(Feb. 1992).
61. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 656
(1986) (citing Bazelon, The Defective Assitance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973).
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tives and as many assistants to help, and pay as much money to defend
you as to prosecute you."62 Darrow recognized the way that our crim-
inal justice system should function, but the unfortunate reality is that
far fewer funds are spent to defend people than to prosecute them.
The total expenditures for the criminal justice system in both the
state and federal systems display an inequity in the distribution of re-
sources. The federal government spends approximately $10 billion
dollars per year on the criminal justice system: $4 billion is for police
protection; $1.5 billion is prosecution and legal services; $1,5 billion is
for corrections; and, only $406 million is for public defense.63 State
and local governments combined spend approximately $64 billion dol-
lars on the criminal justice system: $28 billion is for police; $4 billion is
for prosecution and legal services; $23 billion is for corrections; and,
only $1 million is for public defense.' 4
The financial support given to public defenders' offices is simply
insufficient to provide the truly effective assistance of counsel as man-
dated by the Constitution.65 Across the nation, the bulk of criminal
justice funds go to the police, prosecutors and jails. Only 2.3% of the
seventy-four billion dollars spent on the justice system in 1990 went to
pay for attorneys for indigent defendants while 7.4% went to the pros-
ecution.66 However, the number of defendants unable to afford an
attorney has risen dramatically, from forty-eight percent in 1982 to
eighty percent today.67 Public defenders handle over 11 million of the
13 million criminal cases which are tried annually.68 Yet, as of 1990,
the United States Department of Justice found that nationally, public
defenders are receiving less than one-third of the resources provided
62. Abbe Smith, The Public Defender: The Practice of Law in the Shadows of Repute
by Lisa J. Maclntyre, 62 TEMP. L. Rv. 651, 661 (1989) (reviewing A. WEmBERG, ATToR-
NEY FOR THE DAMNED (1957)).
63. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDr-
TURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S., 202 (1993).
64. Id.
65. This same argument can be made for appellate level public defenders. The Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender Association concluded that "many indigent capital defend-
ants are not receiving the assistance of a lawyer sufficiently skilled in practice to render
quality assistance." Klein, supra note 25, at 367.
66. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 1.
67. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 4; A.B.A. Annual Meeting, supra note 28.
Indigency rates among prisoners on death row requiring expensive legal appeals is even
higher. In California alone, every one of the 384 men and four women on death row as of
July 1, 1994, was poor enough to qualify for a lawyer at state expense. Bob Egelko, Search
for Wealthy Inhabitants of Death Row Comes Up Empty, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 14, 1994, at
9A.
68. Gary Boulard, Budget Cuts by States Hit Public Defenders, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONr-
TOR, June 1, 1994, at 7.
UNDERFUNDING OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS
to the prosecution.69 Prosecutors' offices received $5.5 billion dollars
from federal,70 state, local, county and municipal governments7' as op-
posed to the $1.7 billion provided for public defense by the same gov-
ernment sources.72  Moreover, defense lawyers are further
overwhelmed by additional resources provided to prosecutors includ-
ing a great deal of investigatory work by law enforcement which are
officially classified as "police expenditures."'73
A 1990 National Institute of Justice report found that 80% of the
public defenders surveyed believed that more attorneys were needed
to represent the indigent, in order to fill the gap between the number
of defenders and increasing caseloads.74 Approximately 95% of re-
spondents believed that the public defender's budget was less than the
corresponding prosecutor's budget covering indigent defense cases.75
As the ABA's Ad Hoc Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis
concluded: "While all components of the criminal justice system are
suffering from the lack of adequate resources, the current level of
funding for a majority of the indigent defense programs around the
country has reached the crisis level and threatens the effective imple-
mentation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. '76 This kind of
resource disparity is just one of the reasons why many believe indigent
69. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON JUSTICE EX-
PENDITURE & EMPLOYMENT IN 1990, at 3, (1992).
70. From the federal government, the prosecution receives $1,518,098,000 and public
defense receives $405,771,000. Id.
71. The prosecution receives 3,982,041,000 dollars from all state and local sources and
the defense only receives 1,336,266,000 dollars. Id.
72. Id. Prosecutors must satisfy a higher burden of proof in a criminal case by proving
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when the defense, in theory, has no bur-
den because the defendant is supposed to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Yet,
the conviction rates for prosecutors in this country are quite high. In fact, in a survey of
felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties in the United States, only thirty-one
percent are not convicted, and only one percent of those are actually acquitted at trial
rather than dismissed. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPr. OF JUSTICE, FELONY
DEFEIDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 13 (1990). It is also true that prosecution fund-
ing must be used to prosecute defendants in civil cases when only a limited number of civil
defendants are entitled to defense counsel, even if they are indigent. Additionally, prose-
cutors must represent the state in the twenty percent of criminal matters where the defend-
ant can afford private criminal defense attorneys. Yet, the justice system total expenditures
still clearly disadvantage public defenders when one considers that prosecution is receiving
over 300% more money than all public defense systems. This includes not only public
defenders but all government programs that pay the fees of court-appointed counsel. BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE & EMPLOY-
MENT, 1990, at 2 (1992).
73. Klein, supra note 61, at 675.
74. Klein, supra note 25, at 391.
75. Id.
76. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 1.
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criminal defendants are not competing on a fair playing field, and why
their lawyers are often unable to provide them an adequate defense.
77
Mary Broderick of the National Legal Aid and Defender Associ-
ation said, "We aren't being given the same weapons. It's like trying
to deal with smart bombs when all you've got is a couple of cap
pistols.""s
She further stated that, "if you pin them [prosecutors] down
about their budgets and staffing, you'll find that the resources avail-
able to the prosecutors are much greater than [those] available to the
defense for handling the same cases .... Prosecutors have access to
'free' services from police, crime labs, the FBI, etc., while indigent-
defense programs have to pay for investigations, lab work, expert wit-
nesses, etc., from their own budgets.179 Broderick expresses what
many believe, that "[t]he only way to have an effective and efficient
criminal-justice system is to adequately fund all its components-
courts, prosecution and defense."80
To mount an effective defense, lawyers must have time for each
case they are assigned: time to meet with the client, time to interview
witnesses, and time to properly investigate, research and arrange for
any necessary expert witnesses for trial. In addition, the lawyer
should have available adequate support services, expert witnesses, so-
cial workers and investigators."' These basic resources necessary to
provide clients with adequate counsel are often unavailable to lawyers
in public defenders' offices.82
Many public defenders themselves admit frustration. Some even
say they feel they are violating their clients' constitutional rights be-
cause they are unable to spend the time or resources that they believe
their client's cases merit. Richard Teisser, a New Orleans public de-
fender, regularly represented ninety people charged with serious felo-
77. It is true that prosecutors must litigate all criminal matters including those handled
by private criminal defense attorneys, but since approximately eighty percent of criminal
defendants are indigent and require a publicly funded attorney, this allocation of funds
seems unequal, especially considering that the police resources are much more likely to be
spent on assisting the prosecutor than defense counsel. See A.B.A. Annual Meeting, supra
note 28, at 9.
78. Smolowe, supra note 22, at 48-49.
79. Johns, supra note 22, at C1.
80. Id.
81. Daniels, supra note 60, at 139.
82. In capital cases, which are often the most difficult and labor intensive of criminal
cases, the lack of resources for indigent defense has a profound impact upon which defend-
ant's occupy the death rows of this country. As Kica Matos, capital punishment research
director for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund said, "If you have money and you can afford
adequate counsel, you don't end up on death row." See Egelko, supra note 67, at 9A.
nies, and his office had no money to hire experts, find witnesses or
even buy new law books for their library.83 Although he handled
about 450 felony cases a year-three times the ABA's recommended
yearly caseload-his salary was just $18,500. 4 Teisser eventually de-
cided he could not fairly represent all his clients, so he filed suit
against himself demanding that the judge declare his work inadequate
and order the state to provide money to hire more lawyers.8' The
judge agreed and found the state's indigent defense system unconsti-
tutional.86 The judge said, "Not even a lawyer with an'S' on his chest
could do the job Mr. Teisser has been asked to do."187 Teisser stated,
"This is a test of whether there is justice in the United States ... If
you're only going to pay it lip service then get rid of Gideon."88
Teisser believes that given "[t]he circumstances that public defenders
work under, they're all ineffective, and the trial courts should have to
rule on that each and every time."89 Other suits have been fied in at
least five states which also challenge the funding and staffing of indi-
gent defense programs.'
New Orleans is not the only public defender office whose repre-
sentation has been found unconstitutional due to lack of resources.
Robert Spangenberg, 91 who conducted a yearlong study on indigent
defense systems for the ABA, said that "[t]he public defenders in Ten-
nessee are so overworked and so underfunded that the state criminal
justice system is in a real crisis." 9 Although indigent cases in Tennes-
see have tripled since 1986 and three out of every four defendants
cannot afford a lawyer, funding for Tennessee public defenders has
barely increased. 93 "The problem is so bad," says Knoxville lawyer
Ann Short, president of the Tennessee Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, "that I believe there is a clear and present danger that
innocent people are going to jail because public defenders are so over-
83. Smolowe, supra note 22, at 48.
84. Andy Court & Kevin Bell, Public Defenders: To The Barricades!, Am. LAW., May
1992, at 99.
85. Smolowe, supra note 22, at 48.
86. Id.
87. James H. Andrews, Poor Defendants and Foggy Mirrors, CHRISrITAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Mar. 29, 1993, at 13.
88. Smolowe, supra note 22, at 48.
89. Court & Bell, supra note 56.
90. Id.
91. Robert Spangenberg's Massachusetts Institute studied defense systems for the in-
digent in more than 40 states for the American Bar Association.
92. Mark Curriden, Tenn. Defense for Poor Called Inadequate, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
July 9, 1993, at C2.
93. Id.
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worked and have so few resources that their cases cannot be thor-
oughly investigated and defended."'94
In Atlanta, the local bar association and an independent consult-
ant described their public defender system in this way: "Suspects are
held in jail as long as three or four months, often without seeing a
lawyer, before they are arraigned... they are represented by lawyers
carrying caseloads as much as four times the maximum recommended
by national guidelines, and ... they often fail to get even the most
cursory review of their cases by their lawyers." 95 In Indianapolis, it
was reported that "[t]he system, as practiced in Marion County,
makes a mockery of the notion of equal justice because only poor
people are deprived of adequate representation. This means, of
course that the indigents accused have a slim chance at receiving ade-
quate legal representation and counsel. ' 96 At the Maricopa County
Public Defender's Office in Phoenix, Arizona, the annual public de-
fender felony-trial caseload is 82% above that recommended by the
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards. 97 As
one Maricopa County public defender put it, "public defender[s] who
have too large a caseload cannot realistically give a client effective
assistance of counsel with any regularity."98 In New York, the situa-
tion was described by the president of the Association of Legal Aid
Attorneys: "[H]orror stories abound. Defendants do not see their
lawyers for months because the lawyers are not physically able to get
to all the courtrooms in which they have cases in a given morning." 99
Although some public defender offices are better funded than
others, lack of resources is a problem that seems to affect indigent
defense systems throughout the nation. Robert Spangenberg said,
"Public defenders' offices face severe financing problems almost every
place in the country."'" One recent survey found that "[v]irtually no
assigned counsel program in the country is adequately funded. In fact,
94. Id.
95. Applebome, supra note 58, at B5.
96. Charles Blair, Cracks in the Legal System Leave Defendants Guilty by Reason of
Poverty, INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER, Jan. 30, 1993, at A4.
97. Johns, supra note 22, at C1. Trial lawyers are not the only ones overworked in
Maricopa County: the caseloads for appellate defenders exceed the recommended amount
by 161%; juvenile attorneys caseloads are 31% over; and attorney's handling mental-
health-commitment cases are over by 290%. Id.
98. Id.
99. Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of
the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1171, 1183 (1988) (quoting Schneinder, You
Can't Afford a Lawyer if You Don't Have a Dime, BLIND JusTIcE, Feb. 1987 at 1, Col. 4).
100. Applebome, supra note 58, at B5.
the funding situation nationally is frequently and accurately character-
ized as a crisis." 10 1 An August, 1992 study by the ABA's Special Com-
mittee on Funding the Justice System found that the "American
justice system is under siege, and its very existence is threatened as
never before."'" There is also a widespread concern that public de-
fenders may be overusing plea bargaining as a way to handle their
impossible caseloads. "Public defenders often use plea bargaining not
because it is in their client's best interests, but because it has become
'a necessary technique to deal with an overwhelming caseload.""' 3
Thus, the constitutional implications of this underfunding of public de-
fender systems are serious, and this nation's budgetary priorities must
be re-examined.
The problems plaguing underfunded and deteriorating indigent
defense systems continue to worsen. In recent years, the caseloads in
public defender offices have increased exponentially. The ABA
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants found
that, as of 1990, "there was an unmistakable trend showing that
'caseloads of most public defenders [had] grown at an alarming
rate.""' The project coordinator of the ABA's Bar Information Pro-
gram reported, "With few exceptions, the whole country is inade-
quately funded. Some are desperate, some are only beginning to feel
the effects of it."' 0 5
An ABA study on the quality of indigent criminal representation
found that problems in the system are reaching crisis proportions.
Additional funding is desperately needed to combat excessive
caseloads so that attorneys can protect the constitutional rights of
their clients."° Due to inadequate funding, there simply are not
enough lawyers in public defenders' offices to provide effective repre-
sentation.10 7 As these few lawyers get more and more cases, the
amount of time they must spend in court increases and the time re-
101. Klein, supra note 25, at 364 (quoting Nancy Gist, Assigned Counsel Is the Repre-
sentation Effective?, CraM. JusT., Summer 1989, at 16, 18).
102. Johns, supra note 22, at C1.
103. Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REv. 531, 550 (1988).
104. Klein, supra note 25, at 393 (quoting Recent Trends in Indigent Defense Services,
INDIGENT DEF. INFO. (A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFEND-
ANT'S BAR. INFO. PROGRAM), Spring 1990, at 1).
105. Id. (quoting Stacey Colin, When Justice Goes Begging: The Crisis in Indigent De-
fense, STUDENT LAW, Oct. 1988, at 14).
106. Klein, supra note 61, at 1172.
107. Klein, supra note 25, at 532.
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maining for investigation and case preparation decreases. 108 In Mc-
Queen v. Swenson,10 9 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
even the most competent lawyer cannot provide effective assistance if
he or she cannot prepare adequately enough to discover facts neces-
sary to mount a legitimate defense." 0
If Gideon's promise is to be realized, there must be a re-evalua-
tion of this country's criminal justice priorities and its definition of
constitutionally acceptable counsel for criminal defendants. Preserv-
ing the rights of poor people reflects on the integrity of both our crim-
inal justice system and our society in general. The Spangenberg
Group made an important statement after studying the conditions of
the nation's indigent defense systems:
It is in everyone's interest to fund an indigent defense system
adequately-the public's, the counties', the criminal justice sys-
tem's and the bar's. All components of the criminal justice sys-
tem throughout the country are suffering from a lack of
adequate funding, but public defenders.., appear to be suffer-
ing the most. Public defenders are critical not only to their cli-
ents, but to every aspect of the criminal justice system."'
As the ABA's Ad Hoc Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis
concluded, "[u]nless the adversary system effectively protects all citi-
zens, regardless of wealth or power, the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel is no more than a false promise.""12
I. Race Statistics on Poverty and Public Defenders
People of color are disproportionately poor in the United States.
African-Americans comprised only about 12% of the entire U.S. pop-
ulation in 1991," 3 but they comprised 30.4% of the families living
below the poverty line." 4 While Hispanics composed approximately
9% of the U.S. population," 5 they accounted for 26.5% of the families
108. Id.
109. 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
110. Id. at 217 (quoting Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166, 182-83 (W.D. Mo.
1968)).
111. Robert L. Spangenberg, We are Still Not Defending the Poor Properly, CRIM. JUS-
TICE, 12 (Fall 1984).
112. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32 at 25.
113. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRESS RELEASE, Mar. 11, 1991, at
2.
114. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, National Data Book, 473 (1993).
115. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRESS RELEASE, Mar. 11, 1991, at
FUNC
living below the poverty line." 6 Asians and Pacific Islanders made up
3% of those living in the United States,117 yet they accounted for
13.8% of those living below the poverty line." 8 These statistics are in
stark contrast with the fact that whites comprise about 80% of the
U.S. population," 9 but account for only 8.8% of the families living
below the poverty line.' 20 These statistics suggest that racial minori-
ties experience poverty in much greater numbers than corresponds
with their percentage of the population.
A comparison between whites and other racial groups in this
country demonstrates a "severe and amazingly persistent pattern of
income inequality.' 12 ' Over the past two decades, the median house-
hold income of blacks has remained at about 59% of the income
earned by whites which is a difference of over twelve thousand. His-
panics' median household income is 72% of that earned by whites to-
talling a difference of over eight thousand dollars. During the past
two decades, both of these gaps have grown. 22 African-Americans
face an especially disproportionate level of poverty in this country.
While approximately 20% of all American children grow up in pov-
erty, nearly half of black children grow up in poverty in the United
States. l' 3 The problem of huge numbers of African-Americans living
in poverty does not seem to be improving. As William Julius Wilson
explained, "[t]hroughout much of the 20th century, blacks were able
to experience social mobility through good-paying, blue collar jobs.
Now, as industry has moved to suburban and exurban areas, the tradi-
tional avenue out of poverty has been closed off."' 24 Racial minorities
often find themselves in cycles of poverty that are difficult to escape.
Unfortunately, there is no indication that this disproportionate
pattern of poverty will correct itself in the United States. People liv-
ing below the poverty line cannot afford lawyers when charged with
116. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, NATIONAL DATA BOOK, 473 (1993).
117. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT OF COMMERCE, PRESS RELEASE, Mar. 11, 1991, at
2.
118. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1992, at xi (1993).
119. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRESS RELEASE, March 11, 1991,
at 2.
120. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, NATIONAL DATA BOOK, 473 (1993)(Families Below Poverty Level).
121. George C. Galster, Polarization, Place and Race, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1424-25
(1993).
122. Id. at 1425.
123. Cornel West, The '80s. Market Culture Run Amok, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 49.
124. William Julius Wilson, Hope for Our Cities, PEOPLE, Jan. 17, 1994, at 81.
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criminal offenses. As a result, they usually receive an appointed law-
yer. Therefore, since people of color are disproportionately poor in
this country, they also disproportionately require public defenders.
Given these vast disparities in income and the history of racial
discrimination in our criminal justice system, it is not surprising that
people of color also are found in great numbers in this country's pris-
ons. Prisoners in both state and federal jurisdictions are dispropor-
tionately racial minorities. The total federal prison population in 1993
was 64.1% white, 33.3% African-American, less than 1% Hispanic,
less than 1% American Indian or Alaskan Native and less than 1%
Asian/Pacific Islanders."z As of 1991, fully 65% of state prison in-
mates were racial or ethnic minorities, up from 60% in 1986.126 Afri-
can-Americans comprised 46% of the state prison inmates, Hispanics
comprised 17% and other racial minorities comprised 2%.127 In stark
contrast, whites made up only 35% of the state prison population. 28
Statistics from January, 1993, show that, on average, African-Ameri-
cans compose 37.3%, Hispanics 8.1%, Asians 0.5%, Native Americans
3.0% and whites 49.3% of the state and federal inmate populations. 29
Even though whites comprise a much greater percentage of the popu-
lation, there are nearly equal numbers of white and non-white prison-
ers on death row in this country. As of April, 1993, 50.6% (1,381) of
the prisoners on death row were white, 39.3% (1,072) were African-
American, 7.1% (193) were Hispanic, 1.8% (48) were Native Ameri-
can and .73% (20) were Asian. 3
The overrepresentation of African-American men as defendants
in the American justice system is especially severe. Proportionately,
the criminal justice system puts far more blacks in jail than it does
whites.' 3 ' "One of the distressing aspects of the United States's [sic]
prison populations is the very high degree of disproportionality in the
incarceration rates for blacks compared to whites, with a ratio of
about seven to one."1 3 2
125. George M. Camp & Camille G. Camp, The Corrections Yearbook, Criminal Justice
Institute, 4-5 (1993).
126. BUREAU OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES
1991, 3 (1993).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Camp & Camp, supra note 125, at 4-5.
130. Id. at 32.
131. Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the
Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostik V. Florida, 67 TOE. L. REv. 1979, 2032 (1993).
132. Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited,
64 U. COLO. L. REv. 743 (1993).
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In fact, there are a greater percentage of black males incarcerated
in the United States than in South Africa. There are 14,625,000 black
men in the United States, of which 454,724 are incarcerated. 133 South
Africa has 15,050,642 black men and only 109,739 of them are incar-
cerated.1 34 "Nearly one in every four black men in the United States
between 20-29 years of age is under the control of the criminal justice
system-whether in prison or jail, on probation, or on parole.' ' 135 This
over-representation of minority groups is not only a black-white is-
sue-it affects all racial minorities in the United States.
IV. Racism in the American Criminal Justice System
Racial discrimination in the United States has permeated all as-
pects of our society. Unfortunately, the legal system is no exception.
Not only are people of color disproportionately poor, but also they
are disproportionately both victims of crime and criminal defendants.
The phenomenon is well known to anyone who spends time in
an American courtroom. At arraignment, a highly dispropor-
tionate number of the persons waiting to be formally charged
are minorities, particularly Black and Hispanic males. A similar
disproportionate number comprise the jail and prison popula-
tion, and, if there is a death row' 36 in a state, there as well.'37
Racial minorities are simply over-represented as defendants and vic-
tims in the criminal justice system and historic discrimination seems to
be a factor contributing to this imbalance.
The Sentencing Project published a report in 1990 which revealed
that almost one in every four black men between the ages of 20-29
were either in custody, on probation, or on parole.138 These kinds of
133. Marc Mauer, Americans Behind Bars, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Winter 1992, at 15.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 12 (quoting Marc Mauer, Young Black Men and the Criminal Justice System:
Growing National Problem, THE SENTENCiNG PROJECT, (Feb. 1990)).
136. When convicted of similiar charges, people of color are sentenced to death and
executed in significantly higher proportions than whites. 54.6% of all persons executed
since 1930 have been black. See, Rose Matsui Ochi, Race Discrimination in Criminal Sen-
tencing, JUDGES JOURNAL, Winter 1985, at 9. As of April of 1993, there were 2,729 prison-
ers on death row: 50.6% were white; 39.3% were black; 7.1% were hispanic; 1.8% were
native american; .73% were asian; and .55 were unknown. GEORGE M. & CAMILLE GRA-
HAM CAMP, THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK 32 (1993).
137. National Conference on Sentencing Advocacy, Race, Sentencing and Criminal Jus-
tice, 159 PLI CRim. 31 (1991).
138. The Sentencing Project's Findings were published in an article entitled, Young
Black Men and the Criminal Justice System: A Growing National Problem, THE SENTENC-
iNO PRoJEcr (Feb. 1990). The report found that there were "more black men in their 20's
under court control than there were black men of all ages in higher education." Id. In
comparison, "[only] about 6% of white men in their 20's are being held or supervised by
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figures are certainly disturbing, but more importantly, they demon-
strate serious racial inequalities in the way our criminal justice system
operates. Julius Chambers, former executive director of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, said that discrimination in the criminal justice
system is at least partly to blame for over-representation of racial mi-
norities in custody. He noted, "I don't think there's any doubt about
that. It is still a white system: white judges, white prosecutors and
white juries."'3 9 As Professor Michael Torry states, "some bias does
occur simply because whites predominate as justice-system officials
and as jurors."' 4 ° In "Black Issues in Higher Education," the three
reasons identified for the disproportionate number of blacks incarcer-
ated were: lack of jobs, lack of strong adult male role models and "in-
equity in our justice system.''
This discrimination discredits the entire criminal justice system.
As published by the ABA in The Judges Journal in 1985,
The accepted symbol of justice in America-as completely im-
partial and unswayed by color of skin and economic status-and
the reality of justice is very different .... Justice in America
should not depend upon whether a person is a member of a mi-
nority group and poor or a member of the majority group and
affluent. The inequalities in our criminal justice system impli-
cate the courts in racial discrimination and bring disrespect on
an esteemed institution. This no doubt will come as a shock to
those responsible for administering justice who have closed their
eyes and continue to operate under the delusion that justice is
color blind. 42
Compound discrimination faces many people of color in our
criminal justice system because discrimination may be based on both
race and class status. "Wealth discrimination [results] from poor de-
fendants' inability to obtain a private attorney or pre-trial release. As
the effect of wealth discrimination on minority defendants is likely to
be greater than on white defendants, [and since] minorities are more
likely to be poor, it amounts to indirect racial discrimination.'1 43 The
the criminal courts, and more than four times as many white men are in college as under
court control." Id. The Sentencing Project is a Washington nonprofit group that lobbies for
alternatives to incarceration. National Conference on Sentencing Advocacy, supra note
137.
139. National Conference on Sentencing Advocacy, supra note 137.
140. Ted Guest, Crime's Bias Problem, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORTS, July 25,1994, at
32.
141. National Conference on Sentencing Advocacy, supra note 137.
142. Ochi, supra note 136, at 7.
143. Id. at 8 (quoting Cassia Spohn, et. al., The Effect of Race on Sentencing: A Reevalu-
ation of an Unsettled Question, 16 L. & Soc. REv-. 71 (1981-82)).
fact that prosecutors have been shown to pursue cases more aggres-
sively where the victim is white than when the victim is a racial minor-
ity only increases the perception that minorities have less worth in the
criminal justice system.144 The same can be said for the fact that crim-
inal defendants are much more likely to be given the death penalty if
the victim is white than black. 45 This obvious injustice may result in a
justifiable loss of faith in the judicial system by members of minority
groups.
14 6
In an article published by the ABA, Rose Matsui Ochi observed
that "the lives of minority group members have been less valued in
the American justice system than the lives of white majority group
members."" The situation will only worsen if our indigent defense
programs continue to deteriorate and racial minorities are dispropor-
tionately discriminated against even with respect to the most basic
right provided by our legal system: the right to effective assistance of
counsel.
V. Equal Protection Doctrine Implications
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states that "No state shall make or enforce any law which ... shall
144. Joseph F. Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of Race, Crime and Crimi-
nal Justice Discrimination, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2273, 2277 (1993).
145. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987) (citing Baldus study. See infra
note 181).
146. One example of this loss of faith in the criminal justice system among racial minor-
ities has recently been documented during the proceedings leading up to the O.J. Simpson
murder trial. "The disparity between the races on the Simpson case is stark. In a Time/
CNN poll, 63% of whites said they believe Simpson will get a fair trial; only 31% of blacks
felt the same way.... Indeed, such poll results probably indicate less about how blacks
view the evidence against Simpson than about how they regard the way blacks are treated
generally by the criminal-justice system." Jill Smolowe, Race and the O.1. Case: The Issue
Bubbles to the Surface, Highlighting Black Distrust of the Criminal-Justice System, TIME,
Aug. 1, 1994, at 24-25. Reverend Cecil Murray, the pastor at Los Angeles' oldest black
congregation said, "I don't know how we can be surprised about a poll that shows African
Americans are suspicious of our system of jurisprudence." Id. The perception of many
black people that the criminal-justice system discriminates against them is pervasive and
deep. Factors such as the disproportionate number of black people on death row and the
appearance that justice is more likely to be done when the victim is white support this
perception. Since 1977, 63 blacks have been executed for murdering white people while
only one white person has been executed for murdering a black person. Id. O1. Simpson
is a black celebrity who can afford to retain private criminal defense counsel, but blacks
and other minority group members are disproportionately represented by public defenders
when accused of a crime. The perception, which is already so pervasive among racial mi-
norities, that the criminal justice system discriminates against them, will only be exacer-
bated by the continued underfunding of our public defender systems.
147. Ochi, supra note 136, at 9.
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deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."'1 48 This notion of equal protection for all citizens of the United
States was not adopted until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified as one of the three "Civil War Amendments," designed to
bring equality to the recently emancipated black slaves149. Equality
was not a prominent concept in 1787 when the Constitution was
drafted or even in 1791 when the Bill of Rights was added. Thomas
Jefferson wrote about equality in the Declaration of Independence
with the now famous words, "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness."' 5 ° However, these words were not in-
cluded in the Constitution. It was not until President Lincoln's Gettys-
burg Address that Jefferson's concept of equality was re-introduced
into the national debate.' 5' The Civil War Amendments officially
made the idea that "all men are created equal" a part of the United
States Constitution. 52  The country is still striving to uphold the
meaning of those words.
Inscribed above the United States Supreme Court entrance is a
statement upon which our criminal justice system is supposed to be
based: "Equal Justice Under the Law." Yet the courts of this country
have not always upheld this basic notion of equality. The Supreme
Court severely limited the equal protection doctrine's effectiveness as
a tool against racial discrimination in the 1976 case Washington v. Da-
vis,'53 which required a plaintiff to demonstrate a racially discrimina-
tory purpose behind a law before it would be declared
unconstitutional. In Washington v. Davis, the Court found that a
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has
been interpreted as containing an equal protection component applicable against the fed-
eral government and the states. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976)(citing Boll-
ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
149. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were the three Civil War
Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865 and ended slavery in the
United States. The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870 and guaranteed that the
right of United States citizens to vote could not be denied based upon race, color or previ-
ous condition of servitude.
150. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
151. See GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTSYBURG 101-08 (1992).
152. Not only were racial minorities not protected by the original Constitution, but wo-
men and many other groups were also not protected. In fact, women were not even given
the right to vote until the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920. Under the Four-
teenth amendment, gender is only given heightened, rather than strict review. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976)(citing Reed v. Reed, 401 U.S. 71 (1971)).
153. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
Washington D.C. police department personnel test which excluded a
disproportionately high number of black applicants154 was constitu-
tional, and held that a law is not unconstitutional solely because it has
a racially disproportionate impact. 55 Yet, many legal scholars reject
the strict "intent standard" of Washington v. Davis and argue that
proof of disparate impact alone should be enough to find a law
unconstitutional. 56
Before the Washington v. Davis intent standard, the courts used a
discriminatory effect test which measured the actual harm that a law
caused to racial minorities rather than searching for the purpose be-
hind the law. In the 1971 decision, Palmer v. Thompson,'5 7 the
Supreme Court for the first time directly considered a lawmaker's mo-
tivation in equal protection analysis and explicitly rejected it as a rele-
vant factor.5 8 In Palmer, a group of black residents brought suit to
reopen the pools when the city of Jackson, Mississippi chose to close
all public pools in the city rather than allow them to be integrated.'5 9
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's central argument that the
city's reason for refusing to integrate the pools made the closings un-
constitutional. 60 The Court stated, "[n]o case in this Court has held
that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the
motivations of the men who voted for it."' 6 ' The Court realized the
difficulty and uselessness of making equal protection decisions based
upon the purpose behind the law. The Court reasoned that,
It is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the 'sole'
or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of legis-
lators, furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial
attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its
supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than
because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be
154. Proportionately, four times as many blacks failed the exam as did whites. Id. at
237.
155. Id. at 239.
156. See, e.g., The Limits of Racial Equality: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1491, 1493-94 (1988); Randall L. Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishmen4 and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv.
1388 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence HI, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rv. 317 (1987).
157. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
158. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105,
1108 (1989).
159. 403 U.S. at 218-19.
160. Id. at 223-25.
161. Id. at 224.
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valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body re-
passed it for different reasons. 62
The Supreme Court's hostility toward motivation-based inquiry
led many lower courts and commentators to believe that "discrimina-
tory purpose was basically irrelevant to equal protection analysis.' 163
After Washington v. Davis, this understanding that the proper ques-
tion to consider under equal protection analysis was the actual effect
of the law rather than the motive behind the law was lost.
There has been a great deal of criticism of the Washington v. Da-
vis equal protection discriminatory intent standard. "The 'discrimina-
tory purpose' doctrine has come under heavy criticism from leading
constitutional scholars since its birth."'" Professor Charles Lawrence
has written that the discriminatory purpose standard is an impossible
one, in light of the realities of racism in the United States.' 65 He
writes that, "[m]inorities and civil rights advocates have been virtually
unanimous in condemning Davis and its progeny. They have been
joined by a significant number of constitutional scholars who have
been equally disapproving, if more restrained, in assessing its damage
to the cause of equal opportunity."'1 66
Lawrence sets forth two principal arguments against the pur-
poseful discrimination standard. First, a motive-centered standard for
racial discrimination puts a heavy, if not impossible, burden of persua-
sion on plaintiffs, permitting defendants to conceal improper motives
and argue that their actions were prompted by racially neutral consid-
erations.167 Second, Lawrence points out that the damage wrought by
racial discrimination is the same regardless of decisionmakers' mo-
tives. Racial inequality is the real problem, and it must be addressed
by applying heightened judicial scrutiny without regard to motive
when racially disproportionate harm exists.' 68
Lawrence attributes much of the racism in the United States to
unconscious motives. Therefore a purposeful discrimination standard
does not truly address the problem. He argues that,
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in
which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Be-
162. Id. at 225.
163. Id.
164. Veronica Patton, Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine in the Wake of McCleskey
v. Kemp, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 348, 348 (1990).
165. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAr. L. REv. 317, 323 (1987).
166. Id. at 319.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 319-20.
cause of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many
ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individ-
ual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about non-
whites.... We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural
experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occa-
sions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a
large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is
influenced by unconscious racial motivation.16 9
Lawrence uses cognitive psychology to describe why the pur-
poseful discrimination test does not accord with how the human brain
actually functions. He argues that requiring proof of conscious or in-
tentional motivation as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition
that a decision is race-dependent "ignores much of what we under-
stand about how the human mind works" and furthermore "disregards
both the irrationality of racism and the profound effect that the his-
tory of American race relations has had on the individual and collec-
tive unconscious."'7 0 He contends that racism in America is very
complex. It is not the "concious conspiracy of a power elite or the
simple delusion of a few ignorant bigots."''
Lawrence insists that the Equal Protection Clause requires that
governmental actions which take race into account without a compel-
ling reason for those actions are unconstitutional, and that equal pro-
tection analysis must incorporate a determination of unconscious
racism.172 He rejects Justice White's argument in Davis that, for judi-
cial economy's sake, the Equal Protection Clause must be limited to
purposeful discrimination only. Lawrence says,
One answer might be that the neutral principle of judicial econ-
omy distinguishes the value choice disfavoring intentional racial
discrimination from that disfavoring all racially stigmatizing gov-
ernment conduct; requiring extraordinary justification for all ra-
cially stigmatizing practices would simply involve the courts in
too many cases.... To give judicial economy priority over the
recognition of constitutional injury seems wrong. It is to make a
value choice that is no different from the decision to deny that
injury recognition altogether.173
Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose for
every action that has a racially disproportionate impact essentially
renders the Equal Protection Clause toothless and illustrates the lack
of importance our society places on ending racial inequality.
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 323.
171. Id. at 330.
172. Id. at 323.
173. Id. at 383-84.
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Professors Lively and Plass are similarly concerned about the in-
tent standard and suggest that such a motive-centered constitutional
model is a setback in equal protection jurisprudence.174 They state
that since intent based inquiry "effectively avoids rather than con-
fronts unsettling racial questions, it reveals itself as the sophisticated
grandchild of the separate but equal doctrine.... motive-referenced
criteria afford an ideal methodology for restoring equal protection
analysis to the deferential model endorsed by [Plessy v. Ferguson]"17 5
Motive-based inquiry facilitates the jurisprudence of denial and
evasion by detaching the process of review from the persistent
realities and consequences of racism .... Absent proof of dis-
criminatory intent, the Court defers to the status quo as it did
under Plessy. Like the analysis of a century ago, the Court has
created a doctrine that effectively precludes confrontation of ra-
cial realities and constitutionally-driven societal change.176
Unconscious racism in the criminal justice system is especially
dangerous because it can influence decisions made about the life and
liberty of criminal defendants. As Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson
believes,
Unconscious racism is ignored in the reasoning of race and crim-
inal procedure decisions for three reasons, all linked to the na-
ture and phenomenon itself: ignorance, fear, and denial.... A
burgeoning literature documents the rise of the 'aversive' racist,
a person whose ambivalent racial attitudes leads him or her to
deny his or her prejudice and express it indirectly, covertly, and
often unconsciously.
Even if one makes the distinction between conscious, un-
conscionable racism, and unconscious racism, it is hardly ego-
enhancing to think of oneself as the passive recipient of a cultur-
ally pervasive illness .... This seems like a rather drastic reac-
tion when incarceration and death are at stake, but then, that is
the whole point of denial.1
77
This denial of racism in the criminal justice system has particu-
larly devastating consequences, but can be justified by simply blaming
the criminal defendant. "[A]s the studies of modem racism would
predict, one then justifies one's opposition to racial change-both to
oneself and to the world-by citing nonracial reasons. In the context
of criminal procedure decisions, finding a nonracial reason is particu-
174. Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial
and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. Rnv. 1307, 1313-14 (1991).
175. Id. at 1323 (referring to 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896)).
176. Lively & Plass, supra note 174, at 1334-35.
177. Sheri L. Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv.
1016, 1027-30 (1988).
larly easy to do: one cites the guilt of the suspect."' For instance,
because all clients of public defenders are poor and many are racial
minorities, the guilt of the indigent criminal defendant may be as-
sumed without considering that underfunding of public defenders of-
fices may have denied them competent legal assistance at trial which
could have shown their innocence.
The discriminatory purpose standard was taken to its most egre-
gious extreme in McCleskey v. Kemp.' There, a black defendant
who was sentenced to death for the murder of a white police officer
challenged his death sentence on the ground that black defendants in
Georgia were disproportionately more likely to receive the death pen-
alty for killing a white person than white defendants were for killing a
black person.180 Even though the defense offered a comprehensive
statistical analysis, the Baldus study,' 81 to document this pattern of
discrimination, the Supreme Court held that statistics alone cannot es-
tablish sufficient racial discrimination to find an equal protection vio-
lation. Rather, a discriminatory purpose must be shown.'8
In McCleskey, the Court essentially found that the criminal jus-
tice system was doing the best it could, and warned that acknowledg-
ing McCleskey's challenge of racism in capital sentencing could put
the credibility of the entire criminal justice system into question. As
Justice Powell wrote for the majority, "[a]ny mode of determining
guilt or punishment has its weaknesses and the potential for mis-
use.... [Petitioner's] claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into
serious question the principles that underlie the entire criminal justice
system."183 The Court claimed that legislatures are better qualified to
address statistical analyses such as the Baldus study. 84
178. Id. at 1030-31.
179. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
180. Id. at 283-86.
181. The Baldus study examined over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia dur-
ing the 1970's. The raw data showed substantial disparities in the imposition of the death
penalty depending upon the victim's race and smaller disparities which were associated
with the defendant's race. Baldus subjected his data to extensive analysis, considering 230
variables that could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds. One of his mod-
els controlled for the effects of all 230 variables and another for thirty-nine nonracial vari-
ables. When Baldus controlled for these thirty-nine nonracial variables, he found that
Georgia defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more likely to be
condemned to death than defendants charged with killing black victims, and that black
defendants were 1.1 times more likely to receive the death penalty than white defendants.
Johnson, supra note 177, at 1017-18 (citing McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287).
182. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
183. Id. at 314.
184. Id. at 319.
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McCleskey may be one of the most criticized decisions in consti-
tutional history. In fact, four Justices criticized the decision: Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun 8 5 and Stevens all dissented vigorously.
In his dissent, Brennan cited Charles Lawrence's "The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism"' 86 and
noted, "[p]erhaps today the discrimination takes a form more subtle
than before. But it is not less real or pernicious."'8" Brennan also
acknowledged that the willingness to impose the death penalty when
the defendants are black but not when the victims are black evidences
a devaluation of the lives of black people in our society.18
8
Most importantly, Brennan chastised the Court for being swayed
by a fear of paralyzing the entire criminal justice system. "The pros-
pect that there may be more widespread abuse than McCleskey docu-
ments may be dismaying," he wrote, "but it does not justify complete
abdication of our judicial role. The Constitution was framed funda-
mentally as a bulwark against governmental power, and preventing
the arbitrary administration of punishment is a basic ideal of any soci-
ety that purports to be governed by the rule of law."' 89
Justice Blackmun, in his equally compelling McCleskey dissent,
noted that, racial discrimination is "fundamentally at odds" with the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. 90 He cited a
prior Supreme Court case, Rose v. Mitchell,'9' which held that,
"[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is espe-
cially pernicious in the administration of justice .... Disparate en-
forcement of criminal sanctions 'destroys the appearance of justice
and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. ' 192
Blackmun identified why the majority's decision was so entirely un-
persuasive: "The Court today holds that even though the Fourteenth
Amendment was aimed specifically at eradicating discrimination in
the enforcement of criminal sanctions, allegations of such discrimina-
185. In fact, in a 1994 case before the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun renounced
capital punishment altogether. Blackmun said that "Even under the most sophisticated
death penalty statutes, race continues to play a major role in determining who shall live
and who shall die." Callins v. Texas, 114 S.Ct. 1127, 1135 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
186. Lawrence, supra note 156.
187. McCleskey, 481 U.S at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979)).
188. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191. 433 U.S. 545 (1979).
192. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Rose, 433 U.S. at
545, 555-56).
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tion supported by substantial evidence are not constitutionally
cognizable."' 193
Blackmun, like Brennan, also criticized the Court's rationale for
denying McCleskey's motion due to the implications for the larger ju-
dicial system.
Granting relief to McCleskey in this case, it is said, could lead to
further constitutional challenges. That, of course, is no reason
to deny McCleskey his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause. If a grant of relief to him were to lead to a closer exami-
nation of the effects of racial considerations throughout the
criminal justice system, the system, and hence society, might
benefit.' 94
This strong criticism in both Brennan's and Blackmun's dissenting
opinions identified many of the fundamental flaws with the majority
decision.
Others have reiterated these criticisms of McCleskey and offered
still other reasons about why the holding was a blatant miscarriage of
justice. In the words of Professor Randall Kennedy, "[t]he Court's
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp was immediately beset by sharp criti-
cism and, in some instances, outright denunciation."' 95 Professor
Norval Morris also commented that, "[t]he McCleskey case is simply a
miscarriage of justice, irreconcilable with the rest of the jurisprudence
of racial discrimination. It's a scandal and will be seen as such, I'm
convinced."' 96 Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson stated of the McCleskey
opinion, "The opinion is defensive and unpersuasive, and the outcome
threatens our communal sense of justice."' 97 Many others are simi-
larly convinced.
McCleskey demonstrates the parade of horrible consequences
that flow from the discriminatory purpose doctrine. Those con-
sequences can only be rectified if the judiciary first recognizes
that a motive-centered standard for review is dysfunctional and
second, develops an equal protection doctrine which reflects an
understanding of the complexity of race discrimination.... In
essence, the McCleskey decision is institutional racism's last
stand in the same way as Plessy v. Ferguson was segregation's
last stand.' 98
193. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 347 n.2.
194. l. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
195. Kennedy, supra note 156 at 1388.
196. Norval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence is There That Race Influences Re-
suits in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDIcArURE 111, 112 (1988-89).
197. Johnson, supra note 177, at 1017.
198. Patton, supra note 164, at 348, 358.
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Professor Kennedy specifically criticized the way the doctrine of
purposeful discrimination "insulates entirely many of the unconscious
ways in which prejudiced social values give rise to differential treat-
ment on the basis of race."'199 Kennedy believes that the doctrine of
purposeful discrimination conveys a basic misunderstanding of mod-
em racism and was "born out of a fear of too much justice."2°°
The great failing of [purposeful discrimination] is its hopeless
inadequacy as a tool for responding to racial oppression in its
subtle modem guises. By conditioning the availability of a rem-
edy under the fourteenth amendment on proof that a deci-
sionmaker purposefully set out to harm a person or group
because of race, Justice Powell and his colleagues display minds
trapped by visions of old conquests-the battles against de jure
segregation and overt, intentional discrimination in the adminis-
tration of statutes making no mention of race. They articulate a
conception of discrimination that ignores the chameleonlike
ability of prejudice to adapt unobtrusively to new surroundings
and, further, to hide itself even from those firmly within its grip.
They manifest views attuned only to the most blatant depriva-
tions of the equal protection of the laws.2 '
One of the Court's greatest concerns in McCleskey was whether
courts would be forced to grant equal protection relief in many other
areas of our society if McCleskey's claims were acknowledged. 202
Professor Kennedy convincingly argues that race-based discrimination
is unique and that claims for disparate impact based on other classifi-
cations would simply not have the same constitutional weight. He
notes, "Experience teaches that in the United States racial preju-
dice-particularly that which is anti-black-displays an intensity and
persistence that is distinguishable from all other biases. Moreover,
there exists textual warrant in the Constitution for distinguishing ra-
cial and, to a lesser extent, gender bias from other sorts of
prejudice. '2°3
McCleskey v. Kemp has dire consequences for the entire criminal
justice system. As Professor Kennedy recognized, "[t]he opinion fails
even to address the obvious counter argument that it is precisely be-
cause the challenged conduct arises in a criminal justice setting that
the Court should be more, not less, sensitive to any hint of racial ine-
quality."'  Kennedy and others have asked that the Court at least
199. Kennedy, supra note 156, at 1405.
200. Id. at 1414.
201. Id. at 1419.
202. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 317.
203. Kennedy, supra note 156, at 1410.
204. Id. at 1409.
recognize the violation of equal protection. Kennedy said, "the con-
stitutional requirement of racial justice embedded in the Reconstruc-
tion amendments demands judicial intervention-even if it begins
with no more than a candid announcement that existing conditions
violate the norms of the equal protection clause." 5 This idea was
reiterated in the Harvard Law Review special issue on "Developments
in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process"2 6 as follows: "The
Court should recognize that the claimant has a right to equal protec-
tion of the laws while acknowledging that it does not have the re-
sources, power, or institutional legitimacy to rectify the injury."'2 7
Whereas the Court might not have believed it could do anything to
correct racial inequality in the justice system, it could have at least
admitted that the discrimination exists and acknowledge that some-
thing should be done to rectify the situation.
The Supreme Court has relaxed the equal protection intent re-
quirement in order to address racial discrimination within the criminal
justice system. In the jury selection process, a shifting of burdens
scheme was adopted in order to address racial discrimination. In Cas-
taneda v. Partida,20 s a Hispanic defendant was convicted after indict-
ment by a grand jury in which Hispanics were underrepresented. The
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant could establish a prima
facie case of discriminatory purpose in the jury composition process
by showing a substantial underrepresentation of his or her racial
group in the grand jury pool.2"9 Once the defendant shows substantial
underrepresentation of his/her group, the burden shifts to the State to
rebut the inference of discrimination by showing that permissible ra-
cially neutral selection criteria and procedures produced the mono-
chromatic result.21 0
The Supreme Court developed a similar equal protection stan-
dard for the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in the selection
of jury panels in Batson v. Kentucky.2 1 The requirements for the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in Batson are similar to those
set forth in Castaneda. First, it must be established that the plaintiff
belongs to a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exer-
cised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of
205. Id. at 1443.
206. See supra note 156.
207. Kennedy, supra note 156, at 1494.
208. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
209. Id. at 494-95.
210. Id. at 497-98.
211. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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the defendant's race.212 Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on
the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice
"that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate.' 213 Third, the defendant must show that "these facts and any
other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor
used that practice to exclude jurors on account of their race. '21 4 Once
the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to
the government to provide a race-neutral explanation for challenging
the jurors in question.21 5 Therefore, a criminal defendant challenging
the selection of his or her jury need only show that the selection pro-
cedures have had a "racially disparate impact on his [or her] minority
group and that the selection procedures were susceptible to abuse.1216
In Batson, the Court recognized that "[t]he harm from discrimi-
natory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant
and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection pro-
cedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries under-
mine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. '217
Therefore, the Court developed an equal protection scheme which
placed a lighter burden on the individual and a heavier burden on the
state. This same type of burden scheme which allows the plaintiff to
make a showing of racially disparate impact without having to demon-
strate intent should be employed when a criminal defendant chal-
lenges the underfunding of public defenders and its discriminatory
effect upon racial minorities.
The fairness of our system of justice is just as clearly at stake as a
result of the underfunding of public defenders as it is when a peremp-
tory challenge is exercised in a racially-biased manner. Although an
impartial jury which reflects a cross-section of the community is a crit-
ical element of a fair trial, the right to competent counsel is just as
critical. To fulfill the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment's constitu-
tional guarantees of adequate counsel for one's defense and equal
protection under the law, a relaxed intent standard must also be em-
ployed to address the ineffective assistance of counsel being dispro-
portionately provided to racial minorities.
212. Id. at 95.
213. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 97.
216. See Ortiz, supra note 158, at 1122-23.
217. 476 U.S. at 87.
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VI. Race Discrimination and the Strict Scrutiny Standard
The levels of scrutiny with which courts review actions under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause are not always
clear. Courts consider most claims under the rational basis test and a
few groups, such as women, are afforded a heightened or intermediate
level of scrutiny.2 18 However, it is well established that claims of ra-
cial discrimination under the law are reviewed under the highest
level-strict scrutiny-because racial minorities are classified as a
"suspect class. '219 "Racial discrimination was the major target of the
14th Amendment and thus racial classifications are ordinarily 'sus-
pect': this theme is among the few continuously voiced ones in equal
protection doctrine." 0  Under a fourteenth amendment analysis,
laws that classify persons on the basis of their "status as a member of a
racial minority or on the basis of their national origin" are suspect and
subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review.22 1
In Korematsu v. United States,222 the United States Supreme
Court solidified this notion that laws which appear to discriminate
against a racial group are afforded strict scrutiny review.
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single ra-
cial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restric-
tions; racial antagonism never can.223
Courts employ a strict standard of review under the equal protec-
tion doctrine in two major categories of cases: first, when fundamental
constitutional rights are implicated,2 4 and second, "when the govern-
218. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
219. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
220. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 636 (12th ed. 1993).
221. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 at
576 (4th ed. 1991).
222. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
223. Id. at 216.
224. The Court applied strict scrutiny under the fundamental constitutional right theory
for the right to interstate travel in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643-44 (1969), where
it stated, "[a]ny other purposes offered in support of a law that so clearly impinges upon
the constitutional right of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a compelling govern-
ment interest." The fundamental right to vote was implicated in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). The Court stated: "where fundamental rights and
liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade
or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. [citations omitted.]
Those principles apply here. For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no rela-
tion to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so
burdened or conditioned." Certainly, the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel is at
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ment classification distinguishes between persons on a 'suspect'
basis."'
The disproportionate effect of underfunding public defender of-
fices upon racial minorities implicates the fundamental right to coun-
sel and distinguishes between persons on a "suspect" basis. This is not
to suggest that the Court should reexamine wealth as a suspect classi-
fication, but rather that race provides a suspect classification under
which public defender underfunding should be examined when a fun-
damental right is at stake. The underfunding of public defenders is a
clear example of a case where both prongs of the strict scrutiny analy-
sis are implicated because there exists a disproportionate impact upon
a suspect class involving a fundamental right.2 26
Clearly, the government policy of underfunding public defender
offices does discriminate on the basis of race. Racial minorities are
being disparately disadvantaged by ineffective counsel because they
are disproportionately the clients of public defenders. This dispropor-
tionate impact upon a "suspect class" in regard to their fundamental
right to counsel triggers both prongs of the strict scrutiny standard of
review.
227
Therefore, this infringement on racial minorities' fundamental
right to counsel must be examined by the courts under a strict scrutiny
standard. Combined with a relaxed intent standard, once a plaintiff
least as fundamental as the right to move freely and to vote, neither of which is specifically
mentioned in the Constitution.
225. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 221, at 575.
226. The author believes that the disparate impact standard is the correct standard of
review in this context. See the discussion and criticism of the purposeful discrimination
standard in section V, supra. This standard is used under Title VII for employment dis-
crimination and it should similarly be used in the fundamental right to counsel context.
227. Even if the discrimination is seen as discrimination against a class of poor people
who are the clients of public defenders rather than as a class of people who are racial
minorities, strict scrutiny should still apply because a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution is implicated. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). If a rational basis standard is applied based upon
economic class then it should be a rational basis test like the one applied by the Court in
City of Cleborne v. Cleborne Living Center 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In Cleborne, the Court
invalidated a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for a proposed group home
for the mentally retarded. The Court held that the city's reasons for this requirement,
which included negative attitudes of the majority of property owners located within 200
feet of the facility, concern that the facility was across the street from a junior high school,
the home's location on a five hundred year flood plain, and concern regarding the size of
the home and the number of people that would occupy it, were not "rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose."Id at 440. Instead, the Court found that the reasons
"were irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." Id at 450. Even under a ra-
tional basis test, true scrutiny should be imposed in order to determine if the reasons given
for the government's action were actually a pretext for prejudice.
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clearly demonstrates that racial minorities are disparately disadvan-
taged in their fundamental right to counsel by the underfunding of
public defenders, then the burden shifts to the government to prove
that there is a "compelling" reason for its actions and that the means
chosen were "narrowly tailored" to promote that compelling inter-
est.2 s This strict standard of review requires lawmakers and regula-
tors to wrestle with their reasons for legislating and the effects of their
laws upon racial minorities.229
VII. Legislative Responses to Racial Discrimination
The legislature also has the power to end the discrimination in
our criminal justice system. "The Congress has the power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to take remedial measures that eliminate not
only overt race discrimination but also practices that entail a signifi-
cant risk that persons of different races are being treated differ-
ently." ' The Congress has enacted statutory provisions to protect
against discrimination in many areas of American life. For instance,
there are civil rights statutes which prevent discrimination in public
accommodations,"' in employment 232 and in housing. 33 Certainly,
equity in the legal system deserves as much attention from the legisla-
ture as these other areas.
The disparate impact standard set forth in these existing civil
rights statutes is an appropriate model for a statute to protect against
discrimination in the criminal justice system. Title VII, the federal
employment discrimination statute, would probably be the best model
upon which to model a criminal justice system statute. The Title VII
cases provide good examples of instances in which a disproportionate
impact on racial minorities has been sufficient to prove legislation ille-
gal. In Griggs v. Duke Power Company,234 the Court prohibited an
228. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 221, at 575.
229. Although this equal protection scheme could have incredibly wide-spread implica-
tions upon many institutions in this country (e.g., AFDC, subsidized medical care and any
govenment service used predominately by the poor), there is no fundamental constitu-
tional right to these govenment programs as there is for adequate counsel for indigent
defendants under the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, although the author believes that ac-
tion should be taken to reform all government programs that disparately impact upon ra-
cial minorities, this equal protection scheme would only apply to fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.
230. H.R. REP. No. 458, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1994).
231. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
232. Id.
233. 1968 Open Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.
234. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Fall 19941
254 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:219
employer from requiring a high school education or a passing mark on
a standardized intelligence test as a condition for employment.
Neither requirement was found to be significantly related to successful
job performance and effectively disqualified blacks at a substantially
greater rate than whites.235 Chief Justice Burger wrote in Griggs that,
"What is required by Congress [in Title VII cases] is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification." 6 The Court clearly held that Ti-
tle VII applies "to the consequences of employment practices, [and]
not just the motivation" behind them. 37 The Griggs Court applied
the "disparate impact theory," a results-oriented theory, under which
race can be taken into account to remedy discrimination.3" "Under
this theory, employment practices that do not intentionally discrimi-
nate but still have an adverse effect on minorities, violate Title
VII."239
In another Title VII case, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust,240 the Supreme Court applied its disparate impact analysis to a
subjective or discretionary promotion system. In Watson, Justice
O'Connor wrote "the necessary premise of the disparate impact ap-
proach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliber-
ately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally
equivalent to intentional discrimination." 241 Moreover, the Court ac-
knowledged that "a facially neutral practice, adopted without discrim-
inatory intent, may have effects that are indistinguishable from
intentionally discriminatory practices."'242 In yet another Title VII
case, Hazlewood School District v. United States, 43 the Court noted
that statistics alone may be enough to show this disparate impact.
"[W]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in
a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination." 2'
235. Id. at 426.
236. Id. at 431.
237. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
238. Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 223
(1990).
239. Id. at 224.
240. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
241. Id. at 987.
242. Id. at 990.
243. 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
244. Id. at 307-08 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977)).
Fall 19941 UDRUDN FPBI EEDR
The Title VII disparate impact standard also has been applied in
Title VIII housing discrimination cases. There clearly is no fundamen-
tal right to housing in the United States yet there is a fundamental
right to adequate counsel.
Title VIII is designed to prohibit 'all forms of discrimination,
sophisticated as well as simple-minded.' Just as Congress re-
quires... 'the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classi-
fication,' such barriers must also give way in the field of
housing.245
In Title VIII cases, to establish a prima facie showing of racial discrim-
ination a plaintiff "need prove no more than that the conduct of the
defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in
other words, that it has discriminatory effect."246 The plaintiff need
not make any showing that the action which resulted in racial discrimi-
nation in housing was racially motivated.4 7 "Effect, and not motiva-
tion, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal
their motivations, but more importantly, because... [w]hatever our
law was once,... we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme. 248 Under this
Title VIII scheme, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the government to demon-
strate that its conduct was necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest.249
If hard evidence of disparate impact or even statistics demon-
strating disparate impact against people of color is enough to rule a
practice illegal in the employment and housing contexts, it surely
should be sufficient in the right to counsel context. While the rights to
employment and housing are important, the Constitution does not ex-
plicitly guarantee either of them. However, the Sixth Amendment ex-
plicitly guarantees the right to counsel for criminal defendants. This
fundamental right should be analyzed under the same disparate im-
245. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819,826 (8th Cir. 1974); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
246. See United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799,808 (5th Cir. 1974).
Other circuits have also held that discriminatory impact is a sufficient showing under Title
VIII. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984).
247. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185; United Farmworkers, 493 F.2d at 808.
248. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401,
497 (D.D.C. 1967)).
249. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185; United Farmworkers, 493 F.2d at 809.
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pact standard that is applied in employment and housing discrimina-
tion brought under the civil rights acts.
As in the employment and housing contexts, extensive discrimi-
nation against racial minorities pervades the criminal justice system
and cries out to be addressed and rectified. To adhere to the status
quo of race discrimination in the justice system by enforcing a purpose
rather than a disparate impact standard is unconscionable. "Sustained
discrimination depends upon institutions and circumstances that dis-
advantage certain groups without resort to repeated acts of intentional
discrimination. The central discrimination issue in the years ahead
will be to end the perpetuation of past discrimination that often occurs
unknowingly." 2 0 Intentional discrimination is "notoriously difficult
to prove"'" and puts an immense burden on plaintiffs attempting to
prove that discrimination was purposeful. A party's actions often can
be disguised through some plausible relation to a legitimate concern.
As a result, evidence of discriminatory intent is very difficult to ob-
tain, "whether the responsible individuals are conscious of their bias,
and therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether they are expressing
unconscious bias through some discretionary decision making pro-
tess."2 5 Therefore, action must be taken either through the courts or
the legislature to ensure that disparate impact-not strict intent-is
the standard for equal protection claims based upon the underfunding
of public defenders.
If legislative action is taken to rectify this injustice against racial
minorities in the criminal defense context, the government's actions
could be examined under a Title VII shifting of burdens scheme. The
appropriate burden of proof allocation, if these cases of government
underfunding of public defenders are reviewed under a statutory dis-
parate impact standard," 3 should be a three-step process.254 First, the
250. D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment
Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L REv. 734, 776 (1987).
251. D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45 VAND.
L. REv. 349, 353 (1992).
252. Welch, supra note 250, at 773 (quoting Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent
Under Title VII: United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REv.
1201, 1202-03 (1982)).
253. If the intent standard of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), is employed
rather than the more appropriate disparate impact standard, then an allocation of burdens
standard that places a substantial burden on the defendant is even more essential. The
intent rule allows discriminatory policies to continue because it places the burden of dem-
onstrating motive on the plaintiffs alleging disparate impact. Because it is so difficult to
determine a motive the burden should be shifted to the defendant. This need to find the
"secret agenda" upon which a decision is based unfairly puts the burden on plaintiffs to
"read the minds of decision makers." The discriminatory intent standard allows plaintiffs
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plaintiff would be required to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation by showing that the challenged practice has a significantly dis-
proportionate impact on minorities" 5 The burden would shift and
the defendant would have the burden of "proving" 6 by clear and
convincing evidence157 a compelling, nondiscriminatory reason that
explains the conduct.258 Third, the plaintiff would be given the oppor-
tunity to show that other tests or devices would serve the purposes of
the defendant without an adverse impact on minorities.259 Although
many different allocation of burden schemes have been advanced, this
proposal would best be used for cases involving the underfunding of
public defenders offices. It requires that the plaintiff make a clear
showing of disproportionate racial impact while simultaneously re-
quiring that the government prove a compelling justification for that
discrimination as required under a strict scrutiny standard. In addi-
to prevail only if they can prove that the decisionmakers made policies based upon factors
which they deny. The decisionmaker is in the "better position to produce evidence regard-
ing discriminatory purpose." Leslie Ann Coleman, Comment, It's the Thought that Counts:
The Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 447, 452
(1993).
254. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975), is a Title VII case which
employs a three step process for determining cases of possible discrimination.
255. This is the first step of the Albermarle and many other Title VII cases burden of
proof allocation. Id
256. It is important that the standard which the plaintiff must satisfy is something like
"prove," "demonstrate," "show" or "establish" rather than simply "articulate." The Court
has required the plaintiff to do more than just articulate a reason for the conduct in many
cases. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971), the Court indicated that the
employer had the burden of "showing" business necessity. The Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977), Court stated that the plaintiff must "show" a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer must "prove" job-relatedness, and the plaintiff must "show"
the existence of other selection devices. The Court in New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,584 (1979), required the plaintiff to "establish" a prima facie case and
the employer's "demonstration" of job-relatedness. The Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
446-47 (1982), Court required the plaintiff to "show... a significantly discriminatory im-
pact" to "establish" a prima facie case and the employer must "demonstrate" job-related-
ness. See L. Camille Hebert, Redefining the Burdens of Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will
the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 32
B.C.L. Racv. 1, 67 n.211 (1990).
257. The author advocates a clear and convincing standard of proof so that the govern-
ment is compelled to make a showing truly supported by the evidence and which is not
simply pretextual.
258. A compelling reason is appropriate because that is required under a strict scrutiny
standard of review when a suspect class is discriminated against in the exercise of a funda-
mental right. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
259. This is the third step of the Albermarle allocation of burdens standard, and is a
critical prong of such standards in order for the plaintiff to be allowed to propose a less
discriminatory alternative which the plaintiff could employ. Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
Fall 19941
258 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:219
tion, the plaintiff still has an opportunity to advance a better way to
achieve the government ends without discriminating.
The legislature has attempted to take action to address racial dis-
crimination in the criminal justice system. The Racial Justice Act, a
legislative response to McCleskey v. Kemp, was included as part of the
House of Representatives 1994 Crime Bill, but was not included in the
final Congressional Omnibus Crime Bill. 6 The Racial Justice Act
introduced into the House of Representatives by Mr. Edwards of Cali-
fornia during March, 1994, proposed "[t]o amend Title 28, United
States Code to prevent racially discriminatory capital sentencing. ''261
The Racial Justice Act would allow inmates on deathrow to contest
their sentences if statistics showed that capital punishment fell dispro-
portionately upon racial minorities.262
The Racial Justice Act offers a disparate impact standard similar
to the one used in many other civil rights laws. The standard is that
"evidence relevant to establish an inference that race was the basis of
260. Another version of the Racial Justice Act was introduced in the first session of the
103d Congress by Representative John Conyers. This version specifically changed the
Court's equal protection intent standard for capital sentencing, and was meant "[t]o assure
due process and equal protection of the law by permitting the use of statistical and other
evidence to challenge the death penalty on the grounds of disproportionate patterns of
imposition with respect to racial groups, to prohibit such patterns, and for other purposes."
H.R. 3329, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The general principle behind this proposed law
was that, "government shall not impose or carry out the penalty of death in criminal cases
in a racially disproportionate pattern." Id. at 62(a). A racially disproportionate pattern
occurs "when the penalty of death is imposed (1) more frequently upon persons of one
race than upon persons of other races convicted of crimes for which such penalty may be
imposed; or (2) more frequently as punishment for crimes against persons of one race than
as punishment for crimes against persons of another race; and the greater frequency is not
explained by relevant nonracial circumstances." Id at 62(b).
The resolution's proof requirements specifically designated that "it shall not be neces-
sary to show discriminatory motive, intent, or purpose on the part of any individual or
institution." Id. This house resolution therefore clearly rejected the current Washington v.
Davis equal protection intent standard, and instead imposed a disparate impact burden
shifting scheme. Under this scheme, to establish a prima facie showing that a racially dis-
proportionate pattern exists, it may be shown "that death sentences are being imposed or
executed upon persons of one race with a frequency that is disproportionate to their repre-
sentation among the total numbers of persons arrested, charged or convicted of death eligi-
ble crimes." Id. at 63(b). "To rebut that prima facie showing of a racially disproportionate
pattern, a government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that identifiable
and pertinent nondiscriminatory factors persuasively explain the observable racial dispari-
ties comprising the disposition." Id. at 63(c). Although this house resolution did not make
it out of the Committee of the Judiciary during this Congressional Session, the fact that a
law was proposed in Congress to change the Washington v. Davis equal protection intent
standard and impose a more workable and realistic disproportionate impact standard is an
important step in the development of equal protection jurisprudence.
261. H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
262. Bob Cohn, Buying Off the Black Caucus, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1994, at 24.
a death sentence may include evidence that death sentences were...
being imposed significantly more frequently.., upon persons of one
race than upon persons of another race." '263 Therefore, an inference
of racial discrimination can be established through the use of statisti-
cal evidence showing a significant discriminatory racial effect.2 4
The Act is a civil rights measure and adopts evidentiary proce-
dures similar to those employed against racial discrimination in
other civil rights laws. It is based on the realization that prose-
cutors, judges and jurors will rarely if ever admit that they were
purposefully discriminatory in seeking or imposing the death
sentence in a particular case. The Act allows the use of statisti-
cal evidence to establish an inference of racial discrimination.265
To prove the influence of race in a particular case, the Act allows
courts to consider evidence showing a consistent pattern of racially
discriminatory death sentencing in the jurisdiction, taking into account
the nature of the cases being compared, the prior records of the of-
fenders, and other appropriate statutorily non-racial characteristics. 266
If the inference that race was the basis of a death sentence is estab-
lished then the death sentence may not be carried out unless the gov-
ernment rebuts the "inference by a preponderance of the
evidence. '267 If the State shows that pertinent non-racial factors ex-
plain the racial disparities or that a particular sentence does not fall
within any racially discriminatory pattern or the State can otherwise
rebut the inference, then the death sentence will be carried out.268
Although the Racial Justice Act passed the House of Representa-
tives, it had little chance of being included in the Congressional Crime
Bill negotiated between the House and Senate at a time when the
country is so concerned with being "tough on crime. '2 69 The Clinton
administration, concerned about delaying the entire crime bill, offered
to appoint a commission to study racial bias in death sentences rather
than support the Racial Justice Act.27° North Carolina Representa-
tive Melvin Watt responded, "I don't need a commission to tell me the
death penalty has been administered in a discriminatory fashion."27
263. H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
264. Id. at § 2921(c).
265. H.R. REP. No. 458, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1994).
266. Id. at 1.
267. H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2921(b) (1994).
268. H.R. REP. No. 458, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
269. Cohn, supra note 269, at 24.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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The crime bill has been criticized for failing to address parts of
the criminal justice system which disadvantage African-Americans. 272
For example, there is a "severe shortage of high-quality legal help for
poor suspects."273 Also, the war on drugs disproportionately impacts
upon inner-city youths.274 This is evidenced by the fact that blacks
have been shown to receive higher sentences for crack-cocaine viola-
tions than the sentences given to whites who deal powder cocaine. 75
As Representative Melvin Watt said, "This is not an issue of getting
tough on crime. This is a civil rights issue, a decency issue.
2 76
The House of Representatives report describing the background
of the Racial Justice Act stated,
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality under the
law is tested most profoundly by whether a legal system toler-
ates race playing a role in determining who is put to death in
carrying out a criminal sentence. Today in America the death
penalty is being administered in some jurisdictions in a pattern
that evidences a significant risk that the race of the defendant or
of the victim influences the imposition of this ultimate penalty.
The persistent racial patterns reflected in the implementation of
the death penalty in some parts of this nation require Congress
to adopt remedial legislation that will counteract the lingering
effects of racial bias and enforce the constitutional guarantee of
equal justice for al. 277
Of course this constitutional guarantee of equal justice should not
only apply to racially disproportionate capital sentencing but also
must apply to all instances of racial discrimination in the criminal jus-
tice system. In every criminal case where there is the possibility of
incarceration, the basic right to liberty is implicated. Therefore, either
the courts or the legislature must take action to address racism in our
criminal justice system in all forms, including the underfunding of
public defenders which disproportionately denies racial minorities
their fundamental right to effective counsel.
VIII. Proposals
The Court should relax the Washington v. Davis strict intent re-
quirement for cases challenging the underfunding of public defender
272. Ted Guest, Crime's Bias Problems, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORTS, July 25, 1994,
at 32.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. H.R. REP. No. 458, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
offices due to the negative impact that underfunding has upon the
legal representation of racial minorities. The current intent standard
makes it almost impossible to challenge this discrimination within the
criminal justice system. A more appropriate legal standard for the
Court to adopt is either a disparate impact or burden-shifting scheme
which would allow plaintiffs to prove that their racial group was being
disparately impacted without having to prove actual intent to discrimi-
nate. If the courts will not adopt this more realistic, fairer standard of
proof, Congress must lower the required standard of proof as it has in
the employment and housing contexts. The impact upon racial minor-
ities of the underfunding of public defender offices nationwide has
substantial civil rights implications and Congress should take legisla-
tive action if the Court refuses to act. If the underfunding of public
defenders is ruled unconstitutional, either as a result of judicial or leg-
islative action, then there would be a constitutional mandate for
proper funding.
Of course, the best way to correct the problem of racial minori-
ties being disproportionately denied their fundamental right to coun-
sel would be to actually ensure effective counsel for all indigent
defendants by providing adequate resources for every public defender
office. Public defender systems deserve the same support that other
parts of the criminal justice system receive in order to ensure real jus-
tice. If more money is going to be spent on police, jails and prosecu-
tors' offices to fight a "war on drugs" or a "war on crime," then there
must also be a corresponding increase in funding for public defender
offices in order to represent the increasing number of people who will
be arrested and charged with crimes.
As Chief Justice Burger explained at the 1971 ABA Annual
Meeting, the criminal justice system is like "a three-legged stool com-
prised of the courts, prosecution, and defense, within each leg needing
equal funding to maintain proper balance."" 8 In its frenzy to stop
violence and crime, this country is ignoring the rights of criminal de-
fendants. As Robert B. Remar of the American Civil Liberties Union
noted, "The root problem is that government, and I guess society in
general, does not recognize the fact that the resources that go into
protecting constitutional rights ought to be equal to those that go into
prosecuting crimes."2 79
278. Dean Trebesch, New Challenges in Indigent Defense, 29 Nov. ARiz. ATr'y 25
(1992).
279. Applebome, supra note 58, at B5.
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The integrity and constitutionality of the entire criminal justice
system collapses when both sides are not given sufficient resources to
accomplish their roles effectively. Therefore, an equalized re-distribu-
tion of the resources must be available within the justice system. One
state, Tennessee, links prosecution and indigent defense funding by
requiring that "any increase in the number of authorized assistant dis-
trict attorney positions or increase in local funding for positions or
office expense[s] shall be accompanied by an increase in funding of
seventy-five percent (75%) to the office of the public defender."28 0
It has been suggested that if the government is not going to take
responsibility and do something about this crisis in indigent defense,
the legal profession itself has a duty to provide help.281 For instance,
bar associations could require all lawyers licensed in a particular state
to pay an annual fee which would be used to hire lawyers who could
represent indigent defendants. 82 After all, a "mechanism ... is al-
ready in place" to collect such fees because "every state now requires
that lawyers actively practicing in that state to pay annual or biennial
registration fees or dues. '"21 3 Further, a state bar association agency
could be appointed to determine the amount needed to subsidize the
public defender agency in that state.28A Although lawyers may com-
plain that this is unfair and the expense should be shared equally by
taxpayers, it has been said that,
[1]awyers... are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in
the delivery of legal services and realize the need to insure con-
stitutional and professional standards in the defense of all. The
legal profession, having a monopoly on the provision of legal
services, has the burden to insure that everyone whose liberty is
at stake receives competent representation.
2 s5
Additional funding also could come from the interest accrued by
Lawyers Trust Accounts. 6 Lawyers secure their clients funds by
placing either small amounts of money or money expected to be held
for a short time in aggregated non-interest-bearing trust accounts for
future use.2s7 The funds belong to the clients, so the lawyer may not
receive any interest and banks where the money is deposited use the
280. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 16.
281. Klein, supra note 61, at 687-88.
282. Id. at 686.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 686-87.
285. Id. at 687-88.
286. Id. at 688.
287. Id.
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funds without payment of interest.288 In the early 1980's, many Inter-
est on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA)2 9 programs were created
which combined trust accounts and used the interest from those ac-
counts to subsidize civil legal service programs.290 This money could
be used to help subsidize criminal defense systems as well.291
Others have suggested that the Bar should certify indigent de-
fense work as pro bono and allow qualified lawyers to handle pro
bono overflow cases so that public defenders could represent fewer
clients more effectively. 292 The Bar could implement more appropri-
ate caseload guidelines and attorney salaries to assure adequate repre-
sentation to indigent defendants.293 More attempts at diversion
programs and other means of punishment for non-violent crimes also
should be explored instead of long prison terms and full prosecu-
tion.294 Some of these alternatives to incarceration include: intensive
probation, restitution, house arrest/ electronic bracelets, drug treat-
ment programs, boot camps, work programs, and community service
programs.295 Efforts to modify sentencing guidelines to reverse the
national trend over the last decade of adopting mandatory minimums
and habitual offender laws also would decrease the burden placed
upon public defenders and the courts and correctional facilities.296
Minor misdemeanors could also be decriminalized and treated as in-
fractions.297 Also, prosecutors should be given discretion to charge
certain non-violent misdemeanors as civil infractions so that counsel
and a jury trial would not be necessary.298
There also have been attempts to gain additional sources of fund-
ing for public defense systems. Many.states now are using a "mixed"
funding system for their indigent defense services.299 Under such a
288. Id. at 688-89.
289. Id. at 689. Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) existed in forty-one
states and the District of Columbia as of 1981.
290. Id.
291. Unfortunately, the money currently raised from IOLTA accounts is not even suffi-
cient to address the needs of all the civil legal service programs that require it, so dividing
this limited resource even further could create a new funding crisis.
292. Trebesch, supra note 278, at 28. There is some concern regarding the effectiveness
of the assistance given under such a system especially because a majority of lawyers who
might be available to take on such a pro bono case would likely be civil lawyers.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 22.
296. Id. at 21.
297. Id. at 20.
298. Id.
299. John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor, CRIM. JusT., Spring 1990, at 33.
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system, general fund appropriations for indigent defense are supple-
mented with fees or add-on court costs. Tennessee, for example, has
added on $6 to all major court costs to replace a general fund appro-
priation.3° Other states have proposed taxes on liquor to help fund
indigent defense systems since "alcohol is often a contributing cause
of crime. ' 30 1 A legislative provision in Washington allows some coun-
ties to increase local sales taxes by 1/10 of one percent to support local
criminal justice services.3 02 At least six states have considered as-
signing a percentage of the forfeited funds from drug cases to indigent
defense.3 3 However they do it, the federal, state, city and county gov-
ernments must find ways either to allocate enough money for indigent
defense services themselves or help pass other taxes that will ensure
public defenders adequate resources to provide effective assistance.
There also has been a great deal of emerging litigation in this area
to try to force the courts to correct the "systematic deficiencies in indi-
gent programs. ''3 °  Indeed, there have been cases challenging every-
thing from excessive caseloads in public defender offices to
insufficient funding for assigned counsel.3 0 5 Affirmative litigation by
public defenders' clients also has been suggested on the grounds that
they are systematically being denied their constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel because of insufficient funding.3° This type
of affirmative litigation also could be brought on behalf of indigent
defendants of color who have both a valid Sixth Amendment right to
counsel claim and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.30 7
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 16.
303. Id. at 17.
304. Arango, supra note 299, at 33.
305. Id.
306. For instance, in State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984), the Mohave County
indigent defense system was challenged as systematically denying effective assistance of
counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court said, "It is obvious that the caseload of the defend-
ant's attorney was excessive, if not crushing." Id. at 1380. In response to this case, public
defenders in several counties in Arizona have been successful in limiting the caseloads of
individual public defenders to conform to the NAC [National Advisory Council] numerical
limits. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 17. See also, Klein, supra note 25, at 408.
307. After the decision in Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992), these cases
for affirmative relief may be barred in federal courts because of the abstention doctrine. In
Luckey, a class action was brought in federal court to challenge the adequacy of Georgia's
indigent criminal defense system under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a federal court should refrain from inter-
fering with a state court's administration of its criminal justice system. The court held that
"[a]bstention from interference in state criminal proceedings served the vital consideration
of comity between state and national governments." Luckey, 976 F.2d at 676.
There also may be some ways in which public defenders' offices
can use the money they do get more effectively for their clients. One
cost-saving experiment is a horizontal representation system in which
defendants are processed by different lawyers at each stage of their
proceedings. The public defender is assigned to a particular court-
room instead of a case, and that attorney is responsible for all the
cases which appear in the courtroom on a particular day.30 8 The de-
fender only has contact with the client at one stage of the proceeding.
However, this system has been criticized because it makes it diffi-
cult to establish good working relationships and develop trust with
clients when they are continuously shuffled from attorney to attor-
ney.30 9 Moreover, it prevents the defense from developing a compre-
hensive strategy because the public defenders never get a chance to
see "the whole picture. 310 Under a horizontal representation sys-
tem, one defendant may have to deal with two to three to a dozen or
more attorneys during the case.311 Whatever the merits of a horizon-
tal as opposed to the traditionally prevalent vertical system of repre-
sentation, it seems clear that the best solution would be for public
defenders' offices to have sufficient resources to provide each client
with a lawyer who has enough time and resources to represent each
defendant competently.
Some increase in the resources provided to public defender sys-
tems is an absolute necessity. Without enough money, any attempts at
effective representation are doomed to fail. "The Constitutional
rights that protect all citizens will become meaningless if there are not
enough competent defense attorneys to insist on their application in
every case.'312 If indigent defense attorneys are forced to continue
practicing in such desperate situations without proper resources, the
promises of Gideon seem destined to go unfulfilled and basic constitu-
tional rights will continue to be violated. As Professor Deborah L.
Rhode stated, "We want to subscribe to equal justice in principle, but
308. Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and
Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. RIv. 473, 484 (1982).
309. It has been said of horizontal representation that, "Whatever therelative econom-
ics, there are serious costs in terms of the legal representation provided. This system may
on occasion contribute to serious errors, and even to incompetent representation, either
because it discourages personal responsibility or simply because important information
cannot be gleaned from the notes made by the attorney who last had the file." Mounts,
supra note 308, at 484.
310. Goldberg & Hartman, supra note 13, at 10.
311. Mounts, supra note 308, at 484.
312. Trebesch, supra note 278, at 28 (quoting Barbara R. Levine, Funding Indigent
Criminal Defense in Michigan, 71 MIcH. BAY J. 148 (1992)).
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we have no intention of providing resources to make it a reality. '313
Without adequate resources there will continue to be unequal justice
in this country, and the constitutional guarantees of effective assist-
ance of counsel and equal protection of the laws will not be provided.
As the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defend-
ants advised, "We must be willing to put our money where our mouth
is; we must be willing to make the constitutional mandate a reality. 314
Conclusion
Chief Justice Harold Clark of the Georgia Supreme Court said in
1992, "We need to remember that if the state can deny justice to the
poor, it has within its grasp the power to deny justice to anybody. ' 315
How a society protects the rights of the most disenfranchised and vul-
nerable segments of its population reflects the strength of the entire
system. In this country, we are failing miserably in our representation
of the poor and of racial minorities.
The underfunding of public defender offices rises to extreme con-
stitutional dimensions because racial minorities-the class afforded
the highest scrutiny protection-are the people who disproportion-
ately are being denied their fundamental right to counsel. A standard
which will be truly enforced must be implemented in order to enable
the courts to properly evaluate the situation. If racial minorities must
show a disparate impact instead of purposeful discrimination in the
employment context, then certainly that same disparate impact stan-
dard should suffice in the fundamental right to counsel context. The
purposeful discrimination standard currently employed is erroneous
because it does not account for the invidious nature of racism in this
country and does not truly protect the rights of racial minorities
against discrimination. This note has outlined problems with the pur-
poseful discrimination doctrine, and it appears that a disparate impact
standard, like the one used in the Title VII employment discrimina-
tion cases and advanced by the legislature in the Racial Justice Act,
would be a much more appropriate means by which to evaluate the
indigent defense system. The government should have to justify its
policy of underfunding public defenders and denying racial minorities
313. James Podgers, Chasing the Ideak As More Americans Find Themselves Priced
Out of the System, the Struggle Goes on to Fulfill the Promise of Equal Justice For All, ABA
JOURNAL, August 1994, at 57-58.
314. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 32, at 10 (quoting American Bar Association
and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Gideon Undone! The Crisis in Indi-
gent Defense Funding (1982))
315. Smolowe, supra note 22.
Fall 1994] UNDERFUNDING OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS 267
their fundamental right to counsel under a disparate impact strict
scrutiny analysis and be forced to provide a compelling reason for this
discrimination.
Thirty years ago, the right to counsel was guaranteed in Gideon.
Now that right is in severe jeopardy due to dire underfunding. Racial
minorities are disproportionately poor, disproportionately incarcer-
ated and now disproportionately the victims of ineffective assistance
of counsel because public defenders do not have sufficient resources.
Some action must be taken to ensure that indigent defense systems
have adequate funding to provide effective assistance. The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection doctrine and the integrity of the entire criminal justice system
are at stake.

